It could be said that René Guénon’s thought is most controversial when it impinges on the political realm. Relatively little of Guénon’s writing is political. Indeed, many of his followers have sought to label him (and the school of thought he inaugurated) as essentially apolitical. While there is (qualified) truth to this claim, the fact remains that Guénon’s thought does contain political dimensions – dimensions that have thus far been neglected by Guénonians. However, Guénon’s political thought does not as it stands constitute a fully-fledged political theory, but rather the beginnings of one. In what follows I will first make the case that there is, in fact, a need to flesh out such a theory and thereafter I will provide a prolegomenon to any such project.
The Need For A Guénonian Political Theory
For the purposes of this paper, I will treat Guénonianism and Perennialism or Traditionalism as interchangeable. This is not to ignore the greatness of the contributions of Guénon’s successors, most prominently Ananda K. Coomaraswamy and Frithjof Schuon. Neither is it to elide the fact that there is much to be found in later Traditionalists which goes beyond or even contradicts Guénon’s corpus. Nor still do I wish to ignore that Perennialists are sometimes divided into Guénonians and Schuonians. Nonetheless, there is no question regarding the fact that the Perennialist School was founded by René Guénon and that all Perennialists are therefore in some sense his followers – even if the case could and has been made that some of these followers have surpassed him. Indeed, such a relationship is not unknown in Tradition.
As just stated, Perennialists have been wont to describe their school and its founder as “apolitical” (Coomaraswamy 1970 p. 126; Fabbri; Oldmeadow 2024, p. 2). This is an accurate description if the political is understood in a narrow sense. That is, in terms of the daily struggle of different groups for political power, either by constitutional or extra-constitutional means, and prescriptions for how power should be exercised once gained. This struggle, which we can term activism, Guénon explicitly disavows (2004, p69). It is then unsurprising that one will search in vain for prescriptions from Guénon regarding the ends to which power should be wielded.
Indeed, Guénon himself is remarkably reluctant to acknowledge that he is talking about politics when he does, in fact, do so. Instead, he generally prefers the term “social”. We see this, for example, in the title of Chapter Six of Crisis of the Modern World, “The Social Chaos”. This chapter being one of the chief sources of Guénon’s political thinking. We find it also in his consistent characterization of Confucianism as a purely “social doctrine” (2004, p. 63). Setting aside the deficiencies in Guénon’s assessment of Confucianism, it is perhaps the most political of Traditions. Why Guénon preferred to use the word social in place of political can only be conjectured. Perhaps he wished to distance himself from the political in the narrow sense mentioned earlier.
The political is that which concerns the particular social function of what Guénon identified as the Kshatric caste.
But what is the political? We find in the Aristotelian origin of the word as meaning the collective affairs of the city some justification for Guénon’s conflation of the political and the social. If, however, one chooses to read the word esoterically rather than in a strictly etymological fashion – as it has been suggested Guénonians are given to doing – we can characterize the political in the following manner. The political is that which concerns the particular social function of what Guénon identified as the Kshatric caste. It should be noted, as an aside, that ‘caste’ is in this paper used – following Guénon – to denote the universal phenomenon of ‘natural’ caste and not ‘institutional’ caste which may be found to various degrees in different religions.
And what are the special social functions of the Kshatria? The prosecution of war and the delivery of justice, or in other words the creation of worldly order. And on this question – on right order in the world, Guénon indisputably has things to say. If we want to distinguish these things from politics in the narrow sense alluded to above – and so respect Guénon’s wish to insulate his work from the sordid grubbiness of the power struggle, we may call this metapolitics. Metapolitics pertains to all those questions which are anterior to said struggle for power – questions that are generally but implicitly taken to be settled prior to most of the disputation we think of when someone utters the word ‘politics’.
Guénon and his followers … were … of a principally Brahminical type – which goes some way towards explaining their aversion to politics.
We must hasten to add that the metapolitical portion of Guénon’s thought cannot be considered central to his intellectual project, and thus it remains underdeveloped both in his writings. Furthermore, speaking more broadly, it remains similarly embryonic in the Perennialist movement to which his writings gave rise. Yet a full-bodied political theory, according to this perspective, needs to be elaborated for two reasons. Firstly, precisely because politics is the chief concern of the Kshatric type. Guénon and his followers like Coomaraswamy, Lings, Burkhardt and Nasr were (or in Nasr’s case, are) of a principally Brahminical type – which goes some way towards explaining their aversion to politics. A regrettable upshot of this is that the spiritual needs of the Kshatric person, which includes being equipped with a panoptic doctrine of the political, are neglected. Even deprived of a profession appropriate to his or her vocational disposition, the individual will inevitably tend towards what is in their nature. So, a synoptic dismissal of modern politics as hopelessly compromised will not be enough to satisfy the Kshatric person, much less to discourage them from engaging in politics.
...in these later days contemplation is in such a state of confusion that rectifying this must take precedence over action. Such a rectification has been the primary concern of Guénon..
Lest this gives the impression of an overly severe criticism of Guénon and his disciples, there are good reasons for their having prioritized the Brahminical perspective. Consider the Hadith Al-Silsilah Al-Sahiha, 337 – which can be summarized to the effect that, in the time of the Prophet Mohammad (Peace Be Upon Him), contemplation was still in a state of comparative perfection such that one could focus on action. However, in these later days contemplation is in such a state of confusion that rectifying this must take precedence over action. Such a rectification has been the primary concern of Guénon and Guénonians. Let us recall in this connection that contemplation and action are proper to the Brahmins and Kshatria respectively.
Furthermore, the practical aim of the Guénonian project must also be kept in mind – namely to reach those still possessed of ‘eyes to see’ metaphysical verities, and from them construct what Guénon calls an “intellectual elite” (2004, p. 31)(although one may prefer Charles Upton’s term “remnant” (2018, p. 96)). It is unsurprising that such an elite should be comprised of the most spiritually sensitive constitutions. The hierarchy of castes being arranged on the basis of their proximity to the Divine, it then follows that the chief targets for Guénonian writing be those of the highest caste. However, we should remember in this connection that the Kshatric is the second highest of castes – and by no means a distant second. Let us recall that the most shining examples of the monarchical personage combined in themselves both the Brahminical and Kshatric types. The most prominent example of this being the Prophet of Islam. It should also be pointed out that in some of the most primordial societies, that is those of the hunter-gatherer type, the Brahminical and Kshatric types remain indistinct as was observed by Schuon (2005, p.203). This all amounts to saying that a comprehensive political theory, therefore, is necessary if authentic bearers of his legacy are to meet the spiritual needs of Kshatric people.
The second reason there is a need for a Guénonian political theory is because nature abhors a vacuum. The failure to address the political dimensions of Guénon’s thought has—and will continue to result in—his legacy being misappropriated by those who are not faithful to his core vision. In other words, it creates an opening for the forces of “counter-Tradition” to infiltrate and become entrenched, as he would say. A number of thinkers have abused Guénon’s ideas in the service of causes far removed from his own views. Listing and critiquing these in full is beyond the scope of the present paper, so we must confine ourselves to a cursory consideration of some representative examples, namely: Julius Evola, Aleksandr Dugin and the Esoteric Hitlerists.
if Guénonians themselves do not develop an authentic Guénonian political theory, others will provide a counterfeit in its stead.
It is telling that the first two of these are well known and are often the first names that are thought of when the political application of Guénon’s ideas are mentioned. Evola inverts certain central tenets of Guénon’s thought, such as the relationship of contemplation to action and his belief in not one but two primordial ‘Traditions’. These divergences stem, respectively, from Evola’s pre-existing commitments to Nietzchean vitalism and racism. Dugin, a contemporary thinker, draws Guénon into a complex of essentially Heideggerian ideas that can, with a high degree of accuracy, be characterized as post-modern fascism. One need only consider Dugin’s proposal that knowledge of God be “postpone[d]” (2012, p. 181) until we have come to grasp the essence of “being in the world” to see how radically he parts ways with Guénon. ‘Being’ in this peculiarly Heideggerian sense really refers to what Guénon would call “becoming”. Anyone familiar with Guénon’s work will at once see that postponing God until we have gotten to grips with “becoming” amounts to saying that God must be put aside indefinitely! Becoming by its nature is devoid of essence, so seeking to come to grips with it is an endless quest. The Esoteric Hitlerists, the most important of whom are Savitri Devi Mukerji and Miguel Serrano are less well known than Evola and Dugin. Esoteric Hitlerism is a strand of National Socialism which literally divinizes Adolf Hitler. Much of the framework of Esoteric Hitlerist thought is misappropriated from Guénon, and many Esoteric Hitlerist ideas find their origin in The Morning of the Magicians by Louis Pauwels and Jacques Bergier which describes Hitlerism as “Guenonism plus tanks” (1964, p. 180)!
Regrettably all of this has led—in certain academic quarters—to the presentation of Guénon as essentially an ideologue of the “right-wing”. Clearly, there is a hunger among a certain metaphysically sensitive type of person for a Guénonian perspective on politics, and if Guénonians themselves do not develop an authentic Guénonian political theory, others will provide a counterfeit in its stead.
A Prolegomenon To Guénonian Political Theory
Setting forth a complete Guénonian political theory is obviously beyond the scope of the present paper. Instead, the remainder of the present work will serve as a prolegomenon to such a project, furnishing a broad outline of what is needed to develop a political philosophy that does proper justice to Guénon’s metaphysical insights.
The point of departure for any such project is to first establish what Guénon has already said about politics as foundational. Aside from passages scattered throughout his corpus, Guénon’spolitical thought is contained in the earlier mentioned chapter “The Social Chaos”, and in the book Spiritual Authority and Temporal Power.
Let us treat of the essential points of each in turn. In “The Social Chaos” the following points are made.
1. Political problems are second order manifestations of the “decline of intellectuality” (2004, p. 149).
2. Consequently, these issues are not to be addressed through political engagement but through the formation of an “intellectual elite”, as previously mentioned.
3. In the same vein, erroneous political doctrines like equality and individualism are to be critiqued first and foremost in metaphysical terms.
4. A proper political order would in some way reflect natural caste.
5. Democracy is an inversion of such an order, drawing legitimacy from humanity and not from the Absolute, and is consequently fundamentally illegitimate.
6. The different political regimes of modernity are all democratic as they share this reduction of everything to the human. Political orders that centralize power in the state, exercise invasive control over individuals’ lives and prioritize collectivism are not therefore in opposition to democracy or individualism, but are different expressions of this anthropocentrism.
7. That it is permissible to draw on modern thinkers in an otherwise Traditional critique (Guénon makes oblique references to both Gustav Le Bon (p. 75) and Edward Bernays (p. 74) in the chapter).
Spiritual Authority and Temporal Power could adequately be understood as a book length exposition of point four above. Its essential points are as follows:
1. Contemplation is superior to action, therefore any legitimate political regime must subordinate the temporal power (i.e. the Kshatric caste) to the spiritual authority (i.e. the Brahminical caste).
2. The political manifestations of decline proceed by way of a sequence of caste rebellions, wherein each caste is overthrown by the one inferior to it.
3. This provides us with a morphology and hierarchy of illegitimate political forms; Kshatric absolute monarchy, Vaishic liberalism/capitalism and Shudric communism.
What, then, are the lacunae that must be filled if a truly comprehensive Guénonian political theory is to be brought into being?
1. First and foremost, the task of drawing out what are the essential political principles to be found universally in the world’s variegated Traditional civilizations. Guénon and his followers have performed an heroic feat in doing just this in religion and other spheres, like art. But a question mark remains over what principles, aside from the proper ordering of castes, are universal.
2. The converse of the preceding. In other words, we must identify what political features are distinctively unique to particular Traditional civilizations.
3. A complete taxonomy of modern political ideologies, movements and regimes. Guénon has equipped us with the tools for the construction of such a taxonomy with his differentiation between anti-Tradition and counter-Tradition. Concretely applying these categories to politics, however, is a task that remains to be fulfilled.
4. Further to the above, Perennialist critiques of a whole host of modern political doctrines and ideologies, particularly those that only emerged after Guénon’s time, are yet to be made. This include, in a list that is by no means intended to be exhaustive, fascism, identitarianism, the Frankfurt School/Critical theory, Neo-Eurasianism, Hindutva and Islamism.
If action to restore Tradition through political means is deemed pointless at best, is there any room within a Guénonian frame for any political action?
5. A Guénonian theory of political praxis. From the preceding, one would say that what Guénon advocated was a non-praxis, but non-praxis is still a form of praxis. What remains to be delimited is what the boundaries of this prohibition against political involvement are. If action to restore Tradition through political means is deemed pointless at best, is there any room within a Guénonian frame for any political action? What of certain kinds of work, for example in the military or civil service?
6. As we have seen, Guénon has made use of modern thinkers in his political criticism. This may easily be justified within a Guénonian frame by reference to what he wrote in Reign of Quantity and the Signs of the Times, regarding the relative value of modern philosophy as critique (2004, p. 93). Again, the precise limits of the legitimate use of modern political theories remains to be determined.
Finally, the point must be insisted upon that a call to formulate a Guénonian political theory does not warrant a reduction of his thought to the level of mere ideological concerns. Rather, any authentically Traditional notion of politics must serve the pedagogical function of pointing beyond the human limitations of political discourse, towards that which Guénon prized the most: liberating spiritual realization.
Conclusion
In this paper we have examined the need for a Guénonian political theory on that grounds that such a theory is needed to meet the spiritual needs of Kshatria, and that otherwise this need will be met by counter-Traditional forces. Thereafter, a brief prolegomenon to this project was outlined, identifying what Guénon has already written pertaining to political theory, and what further work needs to be done to produce a fully-fledged Guénonian theory of politics.
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